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TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD MILLARD, 
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RULE 23B: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 041300401 
App. Case No. 20060336-CA 
JUDGE MARK S. KOURIS 
Pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Utah Court 
of Appeals remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing on the following claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel: 
1. The defense team's alleged failure to notify defendant of his 
constitutional right to testify and the fact that only he could waive that 
right; 
2. The defense team's failure to present the testimony of defendant, 
Diane Martin, Glenda Millard, and Melody Oliver relating to claims of 
bias and potentially exonerating conversations concerning 
-the defense team's failure to present testimony from 
Davey Desvari and Bill Penrod at trial; 
-the defense team's failure to call a methamphetamine 
expert at trial; 
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-the defense team's failure to challenge this nature of 
the victim's injuries; and 
-the defense team's failure to subpoena records from 
the Office of Recovery Services regarding defendant's 
unpaid past child support. 
In compliance with that order, an evidentiary hearing was conducted on 
October 2, 2008. At the hearing, defendant Donald Millard was represented by 
his counsel, Mr, David O. Drake and Mr. Peter W. Guycjn. The State was 
represented by Mr. Gary K. Searle and Mr. Douglas Ho^an, from the Tooele 
County Attorney's Office. 
At the hearing, defendant Millard waived his attorhey/client privilege with 
respect to his trial counsel as to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The Court then heard testimony from defendant and from defendants trial 
counsel Mr. Walter Bugden and Ms. Tara Isaacson ["defense team"]. In addition, 
exhibits were admitted, including the affidavits of defendant, Glenda Millard, 
Melody Oliver, and Diane Martin. 
The Court notes that pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B(e) 
the burden of proving a fact is upon the proponent of th^ fact. The standard of 
proof is a preponderance of the evidence. 
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the defense submitted a written 
memoranda summarizing its view of the facts and the law concerning the issues. 
The defense also filed proposed findings of facts and cohclusions of law. 
Following the hearing, the defense was permitted to supplement the hearing 
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record with an exhibit. Based on the testimony, evidence, and memoranda, the 
Court now enters the foiiowing factual findings: 
THE EXPERIENCE AND CREDIBILITY 
OF THE DEFENSE TEAM 
Walter Bugden: 
1. Mr. Walter Bugden has practiced law in the Utah legal community for 31 
years. 
2. Mr. Bugden has completed 216 criminal trials, of which 81 were felonies. 
3. In the 5 years preceding the trial in this matter, Mr. Bugden competed 26 
trials and received 23 not guilty verdicts. 
4. In 2006, Mr. Bugden was counted as one of a select group of attorneys 
that were inducted into the American College of Trial Lawyers. 
5. While testifying in this matter, Mr. Budgen's testimony was completely 
corroborated by other trial testimony and evidence and was fully corroborated by 
Ms. Isaacson's testimony. 
6. The content of Mr. Bugden's testimony, along with his demeanor, 
temperament and actions while testifying on the stand, causes this Court to 
conclude that Mr. Bugden was a completely credible witness. 
Tara Isaacson: 
7. Ms. Tara Isaacson has practiced Saw in the Utah legal community for 12 
years. 
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8. Ms. Isaacson has completed 38 jury trials either by herself or as 
co-counsel with Mr. Bugden. 
9. While testifying in this matter, Ms. Isaacson's testimony was completely 
corroborated by other trial testimony and evidence and kas fully corroborated by 
Mr. Bugden's testimony. 
10. The content of Ms. Isaacson's testimony, alor^g with her demeanor, 
temperament and actions while testifying on the stand, pauses this Court to 
conclude that Ms. Isaacson was a completely credible fitness. 
DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF HIS RIGHT TO 
TESTIFY AND HIS ABILITY TO WAIVE THAT RIGHT 
11. Prior to trial, the defense team carefully prepared the defendant to 
testify at trial. 
12. The team conducted multiple mock trials wherte the defendant was 
repeatedly subjected to trial examinations (R at 16:14~1|6). Knowing the lead 
prosecutor was a good cross-examiner, Mr. Bugden personally subjected the 
defendant to rigorous cross-examination to prepare him for trial (R. at 19: 5-9). 
13. The defendant was set to testify at his trial on yvednesday, December 
14, 2005. However, on Tuesday, surprise testimony changed this plan. The 
State's witness, Don Brinkerhoff, testified that after he attempted to kill the victim, 
he spoke with the defendant via telephone. Phone records corroborated this 
claim (R. at 22: 13-20). 
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14. That evening, the defendant attended a meeting at the defense team's 
office. The defense team explained to the defendant that this surprise phone call 
was a "smoking gun" and must be explained to the jury (R. at 22: 23-24). 
15. The defense team observed that the defendant looked "like a deer in 
headlights" and had no response. Defendant then asked the team to allow him to 
think about it overnight (R. at 23: 6-9). 
16. The next morning, the defendant explained to his counsel for the first 
time that, prior to his interview with the police on the night of the attack on the 
victim, the defendant went to his apartment to unload his luggage from his truck. 
Davey Desvari met him at the apartment, and defendant handed his phone to Mr. 
Desvari. The communication with Mr. Brinkerhoff then went to Mr. Desvari and 
not to the defendant (R. at 23: 10-18). 
17. The defense team found this explanation to be completely unbelievable 
and inconsistent with the defendant's prior rendition of facts (R. at 23:19-22). 
18. The defense team also was concerned that this testimony would be 
perjurious and that the jury would find it unbelievable (R. at 23: 24-25; 24: 1-3). 
They explained to the defendant that this explanation was inherently 
unbelievable, and they recommended that he not testify (R. at 24: 6-9). 
19. The defense team concedes that they did not have the defendant 
execute a formal waiver of his right to testify at his trial (R. at 27:1-6). Neither did 
the defense team use the term "constitutional right" when informing him of his 
right to testify (R. at 26: 4-7). 
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20. However, the defense team insists that on dozens of occasions, they 
unequivocally informed the defendant of his right to testify (R. at 126:16-19; 134: 
21-24). Additionally, they never told the defendant he vyas not going to testify (R. 
at 134: 25; 135: 1-3), 
21. Additionally, the defense team sent a letter to! the defendant prior to 
trial, dated 2 December 2005, stating, "At this point, weiare recommending that 
you testify. It is ultimately your decision." State's Exhibit 21. 
22. The defendant's version of facts as to this point is markedly different. 
The defendant agrees that the defense team met with h|im at their office on 
Tuesday night during the trial. The defense explained t6 him the gravity of Mr. 
BrinkerhofF s testimony and the corroborating phone reqords. Defendant claims 
he then retreated to his truck and returned with his zipp^red black book (R, at 
215: 13-16). 
23. The defendant testified that he looked through the book for the date in 
question. He testified that his notes indicated that Dave|y Desvari met him at his 
apartment after defendant returned from his trip on the riight of the attack. As the 
defendant unloaded his truck, Mr. Desvari used defendant's phone. While Mr. 
Desvari was still on the phone, the defendant retrieved another load from the 
truck and brought it to his apartment (R. at 215: 17-24). 
24. Mr. Desvari was at the defendant's apartment I because Mr. Desvari had 
recently been released from jail and wanted to see the defendant about a 
construction project they were working on together (R. at 216: 9-14). 
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25. The defendant testified that he explained this to Ms. Isaacson and 
showed her the journal entry. Ms. Isaacson looked at it for a brief moment and 
told the defendant that she didn't believe it to be true and was sure that there was 
no way "in hell" the jury would believe it (R. at 218: 22-24). 
26. The defendant then testified that Ms. Isaacson told him that since they 
could not explain the phone call or what it meant, the defendant was not going to 
testify- He claimed that she stated, "That's all there is to it. You will not testify" 
before she ushered him out of the office (R. at 219:1-4, 6-7). 
27. The following day at trial, the defendant did not testify. He now claims 
that the defense team did not apprise him of his right to testify or his right to do so 
over their objections and, further, that they told htm in no uncertain terms that he 
would not be allowed to testify. 
28. However, a number of factors bear adversely on defendant's credibility 
with respect to this claim. 
29. The night of the attack on the victim, Susan Hyatt, the defendant 
participated in a taped interview with the police. The defendant's cell phone rang 
during the interview, and he answered the call. The interview transcript reveals 
that the defendant told the person on the phone, "I'm trying to get home. I 
haven't even made it to my place yet. Just my parents. I got all the luggage in 
the back of my truck." Interview Transcript at 25. Yet in the defendant's latest 
affidavit and in his hearing testimony, he claims he went to his apartment and -
unloaded the luggage prior to the police interview. 
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30. This factual change appears to be the vehici^ by which the defendant 
places his cell phone in Mr. Desvari's hand prior to the damning call with Mr. 
Brinkerhoff. 
31. At the hearing, when the State pressed the defendant on this 
inconsistency, the defendant indicated that he was iyinc| to the person on the 
other end of the phone, but was telling the truth at the Hearing. The defendant 
provided no motive to lie about his trip to the apartrnentlwhile on the phone, but 
he has a clear motive to lie in this proceeding. 
32. It is also difficult to believe that the defendantjwould record in his 
written journal a momentary handing off of his phone tola friend. 
33. Additionally, the defendant's affidavit is riddled with numerous 
inconsistencies and contradictions when compared with|the hearing testimony 
and the trial transcript. For example, his affidavit states (that the only direct 
evidence of the defendant's $20,000 debt to the victim was the victim's testimony 
at trial. Affidavit of Donald Millard at 5. The affidavit alsp states that this $20,000 
is "very inflated." Id. at 8. 
34. In contrast, the defense team testified at the hearing that prior to trial 
they obtained a copy of a court judgment that had been Entered against the 
defendant for $20,000 based on his child support payment arrearages, 
35. All disputed issues testified to by the defendant lack corroboration, 
36. The content of the defendant's testimony and Affidavit, together with a 
very careful examination of his demeanor, temperament jand actions while on the 
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stand, causes this Court to conclude that the defendant was not a credible 
witness. 
37. This Court finds very credible evidence, and therefore concludes, that 
the defense team, on several occasions, orally and in writing, informed the 
defendant of both his right to testify and his right to make the final decision on the 
matter. 
38. Further, based upon an unexpected trial development, the defense 
team made a reasonable tactical decision and recommended that the defendant 
not testify. The defendant chose to follow this advice. 
FAILURE TO CALL DIANA MARTIN AS A TRIAL WITNESS 
39. Defendant challenged the defense team's decision not to call Ms. 
Diana Martin to testify at the trial. 
40. The defense team interviewed Ms. Martin prior to trial. During their 
discussions with her, she provided only positive character evidence for the 
defendant. She provided no exculpatory evidence prior to the trial (R. at 102: 
14-20). 
41. The defense team's investigation of Ms. Martin was reasonable and 
was sufficient to support their tactical decision not to call her to testify at trial. 
42. That decision was a reasonable one under the circumstances. 
FAILURE TO CALL GLENDA MILLARD AS A TRIAL WITNESS 
43. Defendant challenged the defense team's decision not to call Ms. 
Gienda Millard to testify at the trial. 
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44. The defense team interviewed Ms. Millard prior to trial. During their 
discussions with her, Ms. Millard made no mention of khowing of or participating 
in any phone calls that took place on the evening of the! attempted murder (R. at 
178:9-19). 
45. The defense team knew about the alleged meeting in the park between 
Don Millard, Ben Desvari, Glenda Millard and Duane MJIlard. (R. at 115: 2-20). 
47. The defense team did not use the alleged pa^k meeting at trial as the 
defense team believed it to be self-serving and completely unbelievable (R. at 
115:2-20). 
48. The defense team's investigation of Mrs. Millard was reasonable and 
was sufficient to support their determination that her testimony was of little or no 
value in the trial. 
49. Consequently, they made a reasonable tactical decision not to call her 
to testify. 
FAILURE TO CALL MELODY OLIVER AS A TRIAL WITNESS 
50. Defendant challenged the defense team's decision not to call Ms. 
Melody Oliver to testify at the trial. 
51. The defense team interviewed Ms. Oliver priori to trial. The defendant 
and Ms. Oliver were very close friends. 
52. During some of their discussions, Ms. Oliver v^ould claim that her 
boyfriend, State's witness Ted Anthony, was jealous of the relationship between 
Ms. Oliver and the defendant. She also explained that Mr. Anthony believed the 
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defendant and Ms. Oliver were engaged in a sexual relationship (R. at 119: 
16-21). 
53. The defense team believed that they could put Mr. Anthony's credibility 
at issue in the trial by implying that he was motivated by jealousy to testify against 
the defendant. 
54. However, the defense team also learned that the defendant gave Ms. 
Oliver rides to her probation visits and that he paid for her required urinalysis 
tests (R. at 64: 14-20; 131: 6-9). The defense team was concerned that this 
activity couid lead the jury to believe that Ms. Oliver's testimony was bought and 
paid for by the defense, thus eliminating any credibility she may have had (R. at 
64:8). 
55. Additionally, as trial approached, Ms. Oliver began to refuse to attend 
defense team meetings and stopped answering or returning their phone calls (R. 
at 64: 24-25; 65: 1). 
56. Finally, after ceasing all communication with the defense investigator, 
Ms. Oliver demanded payment to meet with the defense team at their office (R. at 
131:9-14). 
57. As a tactical consideration, the defense team's practice is to not call a 
witness to the stand at trial unless they are convinced that the witness will not 
damage their case. The defense team believed Ms. Oliver to be a "wild card" and 
chose not to call her as a witness because they were unsure of her impact on 
their case (R. at 131: 15-22). 
58. The defense team's decision not to call Ms. 0liver to the stand was a 
reasonable tactical decision under the circumstances. 
FAILURE TO CALL DAVEY DESVARI AS A1TR1AL WITNESS 
59. Defendant also challenged the defense teamte failure to call Mr. Davey 
Desvari to testify at the trial. 
60. After having several conversations with defendant, the defense team 
determined that he had not provided any information th$t suggested that Mr. 
Desvari would be an essential or helpful witness at trial (R. at 39: 15-20; 40: 1-6; 
121: 25; 122: 1-8; 139: 12-13). 
61. All of the investigation they conducted concerning Mr. Desvari indicated 
that he was involved in criminal behavior and possessed no exculpatory 
information (R. at 122: 9-16). 
62. Further, the defendant described going to Mr. iDesvari's house and 
discovering that is was filled with stolen property and guns (R. at 57:23-25). 
63. The defense team's investigation was sufficiently thorough to support 
their reasonable tactical decision not to call Mr. Desvari ps a witness because it 
would establish that the defendant associated with individuals who had ties to the 
underworld and might damage defendant's credibility with the jury (R. at 58: 
1-16). 
FAILURE TO CALL BILL PENROD AS A TRIAL WITNESS 
64. Defendant also challenged the defense team's! decision not to call Mr. 
Bill Penrod to testify at the trial. 
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65. Mr. Penrod was said to have committed crimes with Ted Anthony, one 
of the State's witnesses. Mr. Penrod's testimony about that association might 
damage Mr. Anthony's credibility, to the benefit of the defense (R. at 120: 6-12). 
66. The defense team interviewed Mr. Penrod and learned that he suffered 
from a bi-polar disorder and was a member of the Third District Court's mental 
health program. 
67. Further, during some of the defense team interviews, Mr. Penrod would 
be completely lucid and coherent, while in other interviews, he would be suffering 
from his mental condition and would be unaware of his surroundings and 
completely confused (R. at 120: 13-21). 
68. Based on its investigation, the defense team made a reasonable 
tactical decision not to call Mr. Penrod to testify because the risk that he would 
damage their case with unanticipated testimony outweighed any benefit his 
testimony could provide (R. at 120: 22-25; 121:1). 
FAILURE TO USE A WlETHAIVIPHETAWflNE EXPERT AT TRIAL 
69. Prior to trial, the defense team retained the services of Dr. Kathey 
Verdea!, who is a methamphetamine expert. 
70. The defense team hired Dr. Verdeal in hopes that she would be able to 
testify that the use of methamphetamine by a number of the State's witnesses 
would adversely affect their memories and perception of the facts at issue, 
thereby placing their credibility at issue (R. at 117: 3-9). 
13 
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71. However, Dr. Verdeal informed the defense team that 
methamphetamine use does not make you more unreliable, unbelievable or 
incredible (R. at 117: 10-17). Further, Dr. Verdeal revealed that, if properly 
examined, she would testify that methamphetamine might cause the opposite 
result and enhance the adverse witnesses' memories (|R. at 118: 2-5). 
72. After thoroughly investigating this issue, the defense team made a 
reasonable tactical decision to use Dr. Verdeal to assist them in preparing for 
cross-examination and to provide a resource of useful knowledge, but not to call 
her to testify at trial (R. at 117: 20-25). 
FAILURE TO CHALLENGE 
THE NATURE OF THE VICTIM'S INJURIES 
73. Defendant challenged the defense team's failure to employ a medical 
professional or to subpoena Susan Hyatt's medical records to establish that her 
injuries may have been self-infiicted (R. at 136:1-9). 
74. The defense team characterized this suggested strategy as "ridiculous" 
and believed that it would have offended the jury and damaged the defense 
team's credibility (R. at 67: 17-18; 137: 13-22). 
75. The defense team also found no similar claim lor corroboration for this 
assertion from State's witnesses who would have greatly benefitted if the injuries 
were proved to be self-inflicted (R. at 136: 11-17). 
76. Drawing upon their experience in defending numerous cases involving 
physically injured victims, the defense team made a reasonable tactical decision 
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to characterize and treat Ms. Hyatt as a brave heroine who was lucky to be aiive 
(R. at 135: 23-25; 136: 1). 
FAILURE TO SUBPOENA RECORDS 
FROM THE OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES 
77. Another claim at the hearing was that the defense team failed to 
subpoena records from the Office of Recovery Services ["ORS"] to establish the 
amount of defendant's unpaid past child support. 
78. During trial preparation, the defendant toid the defense team that his 
past child support payments were years, not months, past due (R. at 73: 20-24; 
97: 6-13; 99: 7). 
79. In addition, the defense team contacted the defendant's divorce 
attorney and obtained a copy of a $20,000 court judgment that had been entered 
against the defendant for his child support arrearages (R. at 73: 13-14; 96: 22-25; 
97: 1-2). 
80. Because of the defendant's admissions and the court judgment, there 
was no potential tactical benefit to be achieved by subpoenaing the ORS records. 
RULE 23B{e) FINDINGS ON CLAIMS OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
1. With the exception of informing the defendant of his right to testify, ail of 
the challenged decisions involved in this hearing were tactical decisions made by 
the defense team. 
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2. Without exception, all of the issues were thoroughly investigated by the 
experienced defense team, and this Court finds a reaspnable basis for all of the 
tactical decisions they made. 
3. Based on the evidence and the above findings! of fact, the Court finds 
that the defense team did not perform deficiently in any of the challenged areas. 
4. There is no reasonable probability that a change in any or all of the 
tactical decisions made by the defense team might have resulted in a different 
outcome. 
5. The defense team's trial preparation and performance did not fall below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment but instead 
significantly exceeded that standard. 
6. In no way did the defense team's performance or strategic and tactical 
decisions prejudice the defendant. 
7. The defendant's constitutional right to testify at|his own trial was not 
violated. The defense team made it clear to him that hel had that right and couid 
exercise it. Ultimately, based upon the defense team's riecommendation, the 
defendant chose not to testify. 
RULE 22B(e) FINDING OF GOOD CAUSE 
FOR REASONABLE DELAY 
8. The court recognizes that the remand proceedings were not completed 
within the ninety days provided by rule 23B(e), Utah Rulers of Appellate 
Procedure. 
16 
G10GS 
9. Pursuant to the rule, the court finds the delay beyond the ninety-day 
period to be reasonable. 
1.0. The court further finds the delay to be justified by good cause due to 
the recusal of Judge Stephen L. Henriod and the need to reassign the matter to a 
new judge, scheduling difficulties, the need to accommodate a one-day 
evidentiary hearing, and the time required to obtain a hearing transcript before 
preparation of the written findings required under the rule, 
DATED this 1*> day of February, 2009. 
y v 
Judge Mark S. Kourfi 
Presiding Third District Court Judge 
Approved as t^o forpx 
G^ry K.^earle 
Dou§lasJbfc>gan 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / Z ; dfay of February, 2009,1 served a copy of 
the foregoing [proposed] RULE 23B: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, by causing the same to be mailed, via first class mail, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Mr. David O. Drake (#0911) 
6905 South 1300 East #248 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Mr. Peter W. Guyon (#1285) 
614 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for defendant/appellant Millard 
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ADDENDUM 2 
ADDENDUM 2 
Utah Statutes 
Q Utah Statutes 
Q TITLE 77 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Q CHAPTER 1 PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation fjiled against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses aga|inst him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses 
in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district where the offense is alleged to havb been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; ^ .nd 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance With provisions of law, or h 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post 
bail and if the business of the court permit^. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopatdy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of tho^e rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon 
a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial 
by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by 
a magistrate. 
Copyright © 2009 Loislaw.com, Inc. All Rights Reserved 
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ADDENDUM 3 
Utah Statutes 
Q Utah Statutes 
Q CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Q ARTICLE I DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 7. [Due process of law,] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Copyright © 2009 Loislaw.com> Inc. All Rights! Reserved 
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Utah Statutes 
Q Utah Statutes 
Q CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Q ARTICLE I DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before fina 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to determining 
whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. 
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial 
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
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ADDENDUM 4 
ADDENDUM 4 
United States Constitution 
Q United States Constitution 
Q AMENDMENTS 
Amendment VI. Rights of the accused. 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
caused of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, an-
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
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United States Constitution 
Q United States Constitution 
Q AMENDMENTS 
Q Amendment XIV. 
§ 1. Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof; are citizens of the United States and of the 
state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the lawp. 
Copyright © 2009 Loislaw.com, Inc. All Rights Reserved 
/www.loislaw.com/snp/fpopwind.htm Page 1 c 
ADDENDUM 5 
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Igj y M 1 / V V I 
Prosecutor: DOUGLAS HOGAN 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PETER W GUYON 
Audio 
Tape Count: 3 t 03 
HEARING 
COUNT; 3:03 
The Judge reads finding of fact into the redord regarding 
defendants attorneys, witnesses, and defendant testifying 
The court orders the state to prepare an order and submit it to 
the court and defense counsel no later than 2 weeks from today 
The court will file final copy of the order jon January 9, 2009 
2,50 
-29-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 2,50 
ffania 
-2 9-08 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
ffania 
-06-09 Filed order; Rule 23B: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
m i f e j 
Judge HARK KOURIS 
Signed February 20, 2009 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on August 3,200?) a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Addenda to Opening Brief was mailed, first class postage prepaid, or by expedited 
mail, or by hand-delivery to opposing counsel on August 4, 2^09 to the following counsel 
ofrecord: 
Kris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Suite 600 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
(Fax: 801/366-0167) 
And an original and 7 copies mailed on August 3, 2009 to the: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(Fax: 801/578-3999) 
By: J\MA y./isA— 
